I think what's happening in private credit should not be unexpected, and we're in the discovery phase, meaning we know we have issues there, and what we're trying to discover is the breadth and depth and severity of those issues. And I think it's worth thinking through where we've come from and why they're presenting themselves. So private equity kind of ran out of market capacity for their traditional private equity products as institutional allocations were full. They kind of tapped into the private sector that was available to them. So they went after the private credit market and direct lending market in size, beginning about two years ago. And while private credit isn't new, and private equity's involvement isn't new, moving it in and putting illiquid assets into liquid structures, like they've done in Blue Owl and elsewhere, have created a duration mismatch. And inevitably, when you get a duration mismatch, you're going to end up with a run on the bank.
And so what we're seeing now is a run on the bank. And so Blue Owl is having its issues, others are as well. I think Blackstone had to dig into their own pocket in order to fund some of these redemptions. Those redemptions have started, and they're going to run their course until they burn themselves out. The underlying issue within private credit is, they went out and financed a lot of software activity, and that's caused the initial concerns, and there are going to be real losses. As we said, they've levered these entities up. I've seen stats that out of 7,000 credits out there, some 38% have seen sequential double-digit declines in EBITDA, so their leverage has increased. In the case of Blue Owl, there's fund-level leverage, and as the funds are refinancing from, call it, 3% and 4% debt up to plus 6%, 7% debt, the strategies just don't work anymore.
The cost of funding is too large. And so what we've seen is credit default swaps for the alts managers begin to widen, and that means there's less liquidity, and that means we're going to have to wind down some of this lending activity, and that then becomes self-reinforcing, and ultimately we're going to see some losses. The thing to really keep an eye on is, we had the Tricolor and First Brand bankruptcies in and around the auto parts supply chain. In the UK, over the last couple of weeks, we've seen a similar situation with MFS where they had double-pledging of collateral, and they were tipped into bankruptcy because of that. And then you had another entity, I think it was Century Capital, who was borrowing short-term from Blue Owl in order to provide bridge financing, and Blue Owl pulled that funding, tipping them into bankruptcy.
So a lot of these elements are linked. The double-pledging of collateral could be a bigger issue, and we could see it start to hit other players as we begin to audit some of these. Now, let's tie it back to something that may be a lot more opaque, which is to say, all of these alternative managers and private equities have captive insurers or relationships with captive insurers in Bermuda. There are easily over 100 insurance companies there. And that's where we're seeing a lot of the games being played where they're not marking the credits to market. They may be slicing and dicing those credits and effectively selling them to themselves, meaning you originate a loan, you sell it to an insurance company that you control. Those insurance companies may then repackage those and put them into CLOs and maybe leverage them 10 times.
And the numbers are large enough that if you just start losing the liquidity or you see rising defaults via software, enterprise software companies, or elsewhere, you're going to start to see problems develop in private credit. And these things are slow, and since they're slow, markets don't do as good a job of discounting them, and I think there could be some real issues there. And depending on how quick these losses are realised, I think they could be quite serious. So, we're talking about tens of billions of dollars, which may not sound a lot, but then you leverage them up, and you're talking about hundreds of billions of dollars. And this is the marginal financing that's been used for the M&A activity, and we already have all these illiquid LP positions that are looking for an exit, and unfortunately, they may be getting cut off from the credit markets as well.