Mirova’s Soliane Varlet compares the impact of the dotcom crash, the GFC and the Paris Accord on her 20-year career as an equities analyst and portfolio manager, and how each event has shaped her perceptions of risk, investor behaviour and long-term fundamentals.
If you could pick one market moment from the last 25 years that you think has had a lasting legacy on where we are today, what would it be?
Soliane Varlet (SV): There are several moments that left an indelible mark, but the Global Financial Crisis [GFC] stands out. Its aftermath, and the idea of ‘too big to fail’, fundamentally changed how we think about risk, innovation, and regulation. Suddenly, there was a sense that central banks and governments were always standing ready to intervene – something that was only half true before. The new world became one where market participants expect a rescue and, in turn, sometimes take greater risks, knowing someone may save them if things go wrong.
And the legacy is ongoing: more regulation, more caution, but ironically also pockets of excessive risk because of the so-called ‘Fed put’ – the market’s belief that the US central bank will always be there to intervene with liquidity, or lowering interest rates, whenever there’s a significant market decline.
Do you believe central banks can always rescue markets, or is there a limit?
SV: That’s the unanswered question. For the last twenty years, central banks have consistently acted to prevent total collapse – we’ve rarely seen a full-scale crisis since the GFC as a result. But we don’t know how reliable that safety net remains. It shapes risk appetite – some take on more risk, assuming the Fed or ECB will intervene if things go wrong, which may not always be true. More than ever, understanding these dynamics is essential.
Where were you and what was your role during the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), and how would you describe its impact on your career?
SV: I was a couple of years into my buy-side career and just becoming a portfolio manager for the first time when the crisis hit in 2008. But I’d already had an intense introduction to market turmoil: in the summer of 2000, I began as a sell-side media analyst just as the dot-com bubble burst. My first research report was on tech valuations as everything was crashing. My boss left six months later, and I found myself responsible for a sector in crisis. Both moments – the dotcom bust and the GFC – left me with a persistent caution for fundamentals, risk management, and valuation discipline.
How would you compare the two crises – the dotcom bust and the GFC – in terms of impact and how you experienced them as an analyst?
SV: The dotcom bubble was more about long discussions and slowly-building awareness. Was it a bubble, or wasn’t it? It was debated over years – bringing us fears of irrational exuberance, creative new metrics, and business models that promised everything. When the crash came, it was both expected and shocking.
The GFC, on the other hand, was utterly relentless. Every day brought new bad news, new shocks. There was no time to pause and comprehend; you were forced to react and cope with cascading risk. It wasn’t a single moment – it was the day-to-day grind of realising how quickly an entire system could freeze.